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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM: 
Donald Anthony Young pleaded guilty to mail fraud and money laundering.  On 
appeal, he raises a single issue.  Young contends that the district court erred in applying 
an obstruction-of-justice enhancement to his sentence pursuant to United States 
Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that the court did err 
in applying the enhancement to Young’s sentence and so we vacate the judgment of the 
district court and remand for re-sentencing. 
 
I. 
For many years, Young was the managing member of an investment advising 
company named Acorn Capital Management, LLC (“Acorn”) and also controlled two 
investment entities, Acorn Capital Management II LP and Acorn II LP.  Using these 
entities as well as a predecessor entity, Young operated a Ponzi scheme beginning by 
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November 1999.  Over the course of nearly a decade, Young stole approximately $25 
million of investors’ funds for his own personal benefit. 
On January 13, 2009, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations (“OCIE”) informed Young that it would conduct an on-site examination of 
Acorn beginning on January 21, 2009.  The notice requested that certain records, which 
SEC regulations required Acorn to maintain, be made available for inspection on that 
date.  The SEC’s on-site examination lasted through January 30, 2009.  During the 
examination, Young produced some, but not all, of the requested records.  On the last day 
of the site visit, the examiners provided Young with a list of 35 requested documents that 
he had not yet provided, including some that the examiners deemed crucial, including 
investor lists and quarterly reports. 
Over the next two months, the OCIE examiners, Young, and Young’s counsel 
corresponded about these documents.  In this correspondence, Young promised to 
produce the requested documents.  Ultimately, however, he failed to turn over all of the 
documents.  According to an SEC representative, if Young had made all of the requested 
documents immediately available to the SEC, the agency would have been able to file an 
enforcement action sooner.  Instead, the examiners were forced to spend time seeking 
documents from various third parties, including Acorn’s trading broker and accountant.  
The documents received from third parties were inconsistent with some of Young’s 
disclosures and, therefore, suggested fraudulent behavior by Young.  During this time 
period, Young continued to operate his Ponzi scheme, and it was later determined that he 
caused investors an additional loss of approximately $74,000. 
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On April 17, 2009, the SEC filed a civil enforcement action against Young 
alleging violations of the securities laws and requesting the return of ill-gotten gains.  
Almost immediately thereafter, Young voluntarily initiated contact with the Government, 
which resulted in a meeting on April 22, 2009 with SEC officials and government 
prosecutors in which Young confessed his wrongdoing.  He also admitted that he had 
deliberately withheld documents from the OCIE examiners.  He subsequently cooperated 
in all respects with the criminal investigation. 
On April 1, 2010, almost a year after the SEC filed its civil enforcement action, a 
federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Young with one count of mail fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and one count of money laundering in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1957.  The indictment alleged that Young engaged in a massive fraudulent 
scheme from November 1999 to April 2009.  Notably, the indictment listed Young’s 
concealment of documents from the OCIE examiners as an overt act in this scheme to 
defraud. 
Young pled guilty to both mail fraud and money laundering.  He stipulated to 
causing a loss of more than $20 million and agreed to Guidelines enhancements to his 
sentence based on that amount, the number of his victims, his use of sophisticated means 
pertaining to the execution or concealment of the offense, his abuse of a position of 
private trust, and his conviction for money laundering.1  However, Young refused to 
                     
1 The stipulated Guidelines calculation also included downward adjustments for 
acceptance of responsibility. 
5 
 
stipulate that his conduct during the OCIE examination merited the imposition of a U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines § 3C1.1 enhancement for  obstruction of justice.  The district court 
nonetheless applied that enhancement, determining that Young’s deliberate failure to 
produce documents during the OCIE examination constituted obstruction of justice 
within the scope of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  The inclusion of the obstruction enhancement 
increased Young’s suggested Guideline sentence from a range of 135 to 168 months 
imprisonment to a range of 168 and 210 months of imprisonment.  The district court 
sentenced Young to a 210-month term of imprisonment.  Young now appeals. 
 
II. 
 Because Young challenges only the district court’s interpretation and application 
of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement and none of the underlying facts, we review the 
judgment of the district court de novo.  United States v. Jenkins, 275 F.3d 283, 286 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide the following enhancement for conduct 
that obstructs the administration of justice: 
If (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice 
with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of 
the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive 
conduct related to (A) the defendant's offense of conviction 
and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense, 
increase the offense level by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  The commentary to this guideline provides examples of the kinds of 
conduct to which this enhancement applies, including witness and juror intimidation, 
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perjury, destroying or concealing evidence material to an official investigation or judicial 
proceeding, and providing materially false information to a judge or to a probation office 
with respect to a presentence or other investigation.  Id. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4.  On appeal, 
Young advances two arguments as to why the district court erred by applying the 
obstruction-of-justice enhancement to his sentence.  Because we find the first dispositive, 
we need not address the second. 
 The parties seem to agree that United States v. Clark, 316 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2003) 
governs resolution of Young’s first argument.  In Clark, the Third Circuit held conduct 
constituting “a constituent part” of the underlying charged offense cannot support an 
obstruction enhancement under § 3C1.1.  Id. at 211.  Young argues that his failure to 
produce documents during the OCIE’s examination constitutes “a constituent part” of his 
underlying fraud offense, and so, under Clark, this conduct cannot provide the basis for a 
§ 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement.  The Government counters that Clark is a narrow 
holding that does not prevent Young’s allegedly obstructive conduct from receiving an 
obstruction enhancement. 
 In Clark, the defendant pled guilty to representing himself falsely as a citizen of 
the United States.  Id.  The district court imposed an obstruction enhancement under 
§ 3C1.1 to the defendant’s sentence because, in addition to his oral misrepresentations of 
his citizenship status, he subsequently produced a fake birth certificate that allegedly 
impeded an INS investigation into his citizenship claim.  Id.  The district court 
determined that the defendant’s production of the birth certificate was “additional 
criminal conduct separate and apart from the basic underlying offense of falsely 
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representing identity and nationality,” which constituted obstruction of justice meriting a 
§ 3C1.1 enhancement.  Id.  The Third Circuit reversed, explaining that “the conduct that 
is cited as an obstruction is actually activity that is part of the underlying charged 
offense.”  Id. at 213.  The Clark court pointed out that the assertedly obstructive conduct 
occurred during the period of criminal activity alleged in the indictment and “thus is 
encompassed within the time the crime was said to have occurred.”  Id. 
In doing so, the Clark court recognized a circuit split over the proper application 
of the obstruction enhancement and adopted the view of the Eighth Circuit over that of 
the Sixth Circuit.  Id.  The Clark court initially examined United States v. Sabino, 307 
F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2002), in which the Sixth Circuit upheld the application of a § 3C1.1 
obstruction enhancement based on the defendants’ perjury to the grand jury even though 
that perjury was part of the charged conspiracy to defraud.  See Clark, 316 F.3d at 212.  
The Clark court contrasted this holding with that in two Eighth Circuit cases -- United 
States v. Lamere, 980 F.2d 506, 517 (8th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 
339, 340 (8th Cir. 1991).  Both held that an obstruction enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1 
did not apply to conduct that was part of the underlying crime.  Lamere, 980 F.2d at 517 
(explaining that circuit precedent holds that section 3C1.1 “does not apply to conduct that 
is part of the crime itself”); Lloyd, 947 F.2d at 940 (“Section 3C1.1 does not apply to 
conduct that is part of the crime itself.”).  After examining the facts and rationale of the 
Sixth Circuit in Sabino and the Eighth Circuit in Lloyd and Lamere, the Third Circuit 
declared that it was not persuaded by the Sixth Circuit’s approach and instead aligned 
itself with the contrary view of the Eighth Circuit.  See Clark, 316 F.3d at 213. 
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In the case at hand, as in Clark, Young’s assertedly obstructive conduct occurred 
during the period of criminal activity alleged in the indictment.  The indictment 
specifically charges that the scheme to defraud continued during the time of the OCIE 
investigation, i.e., from November 1999 through April 2009.  Moreover, the indictment 
also charges the asserted obstructive conduct as an overt act, alleging that beginning in 
January 2009, Young “attempted to thwart the investigation by refusing to supply the 
SEC with documents he was required to supply . . . .”  Inclusion of this conduct in the 
indictment is hardly unusual; crimes involving fraud frequently include conduct 
constituting “false or fraudulent pretenses[ and] representations.”  18 U.S.C. § 1341; cf. 
United States v. Werlinger, 894 F.2d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting an 
obstruction-of-justice enhancement based on the defendant’s entreaties to his co-workers 
to help conceal his embezzlement in advance of an internal audit and noting that the 
“offense of bank embezzlement itself encompasses elements of fraud, deceit, and 
concealment” and “[i]t is difficult to imagine an embezzler who does not take some 
affirmative steps to conceal his wrongdoing”).  Thus, here, as in Clark, “the conduct that 
is cited as an obstruction is actually activity that is part of the underlying charged 
offense.”  Clark, 316 F.3d at 213.2 
                     
2 The Government maintains that Clark is in fact a “very narrow” holding that 
applies only in cases in which the allegedly obstructive conduct is identical to the 
underlying offense.  The Government bases this contention on the Clark court’s passing 
observation that there (unlike the case at hand), the assertedly obstructive conduct -- 
production of a false birth certificate -- was itself a violation of the relevant statute and so 
“had precisely the same effect” as the charged crime.  Clark, 316 F.3d at 213.  The 
Government makes too much of this one sentence.  For, if the Clark holding were so 
(Continued) 
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Accordingly, we must reject the Government’s contention here that the obstructive 
conduct in this case is separate from the charged crime, and thus constitutes a proper 
basis for the obstruction enhancement.  In sum, we conclude that Clark requires us to 
hold that the district court erred by applying an obstruction-of-justice enhancement to 
Young’s sentence.3 
 
III. 
We recognize that the district court may decide that, pursuant to proper application 
of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors (which may take into account Young’s conduct with 
respect to the SEC investigation), Young nonetheless merits a longer sentence than 
provided by the new guideline calculation, including a sentence of 210 months.  But 
given that the court sentenced Young using an improper Guideline calculation, we must 
vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for resentencing. 
                     
 
narrow, the court’s analysis of relevant precedent from the Sixth and Eighth Circuits 
would have been superfluous and the court would not have needed to reach the circuit 
split.  We are persuaded that Clark held that obstructive conduct need only be “part of the 
underlying charged offense” to avoid the § 3C1.1 enhancement.  Id. 
3 The Government also asserts that U.S. Sentencing Guideline Application Note 
4(D) covers Young’s conduct.  Application Note 4 provides examples of conduct covered 
by § 3C1.1, including “concealing . . . evidence that is material to an official 
investigation.”  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(D) (emphasis added).  The Government 
insists that Young’s conduct falls squarely within this example, but the record provides 
no support for the conclusion that OCIE’s examination into Acorn was anything other 
than routine regulatory oversight.  It seems unlikely that such an examination constitutes 
an “official investigation” within the meaning of Application Note 4(D).  But even if the 
OCIE’s examination is an “official investigation,” the Clark rationale would still preclude 
the application of the enhancement in the case at hand. 
